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Washington, Erdut and Dayton:
Negotiating and Implementing Peace
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
Peter W. Galbraith*
Three peace agreements ended the conflict in the former Yugoslavia: the
Washington Agreement, which created the Muslim-Croat Federation; the
Erdut Agreement, which peacefully reintegrated the last Serb-held territory
into Croatia; and the Dayton Agreement, which established a detailed
framework for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States played the
decisive role in all three agreements. Why did we succeed where others
failed? Because we correctly identified the cause of the war and backed
diplomacy with force.
The war in the former Yugoslavia had its roots in the recent, not the
distant, past. Yugoslavia was constituted in the aftermath of World War I
as a multinational state. In the aftermath of World War II, it was
reconstituted as a communist federal state of six republics. The collapse of
Communism and the end of the Cold War dissolved the glue that held
these republics together.
In 1990, Slovenia and Croatia tried to renegotiate the terms of the
federation. When that failed, because Serbia would not go along, Slovenia
and Croatia moved to secede. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), which
was the only real federal institution remaining after the Communist Party
fragmented along national lines, tried to resist any secession by Slovenia
and Croatia. But Serbia, after initially aligning itself with the JNA in an
attempt to hold the country together, then decided to let the Slovenes and
Croatians go, as long as it could hold onto the Serb areas of Croatia-the
Krajina, in the western part of the country; Slavonia, along the border with
Yugoslavia; and an area south-east of the capital, Zagreb. Local Serbs in
Croatia, who feared the revival of Croatian nationalism, organized a
rebellion in these areas, declared their independence from Croatia, and
announced the establishment of an entity called the Republika Srpska
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Krajina (RSK). The JNA intervened on their behalf. The process of ethnic
cleansing actually began in the Serb-held parts of Croatia, from which the
Serbs expelled the Croat population.
As Yugoslavia descended into war in 1991, the Europeans told the
Bugh Administration that this was a European problem and that Europe
would solve it. In the afterglow of victory in the Gulf War, facing the
imminent implosion of both the Soviet Union and the American economy,
the Bush Administration was happy to oblige. It did, however, take one
very fateful step. On September 13, 1991, it joined the Europeans in the
U.N. Security Council by voting for an arms embargo against all of the
belligerents in the Yugoslav conflict.
This seemingly sensible step had no impact on the well-armed JNA's
ability to attack Croatia. It did, however, have a significant impact on the
ability of the poorly-armed Croatians to defend themselves. The arms
embargo had even more catastrophic consequences a year later in Bosnia,
where the Bosnian Serb forces, which were nothing more than re-labeled
JNA forces, rained death and destruction on Sarajevo and other civilian
targets from distant locations.
At the end of 1991, U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance negotiated an end to the
fighting in Croatia. The Vance Agreement provided for the deployment of
U.N. forces to protect the supposedly demilitarized Serb-held areas, which
became known as U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs). In fact, however, these
regions were never demilitarized, and low-level fighting continued until
April 1994, when the U.S. helped negotiate a cease-fire. The U.N. presence
in Croatia preserved the status quo until the summer of 1995, when the
Croatians recaptured three of the four UNPAs-all except Eastern Slavonia.
At the end of 1991, in another fateful step, the Europeans also
announced the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. This recognition set
the stage for the final peace settlement, because it established Slovenia and
Croatia as sovereign entities with internationally recognized borders, and
helped thwart the dream of a Greater Serbia by making the eventual
annexation of Croatian Serb territory unlikely. Indeed, in May 1992,
Serbia and Montenegro reconstituted themselves as the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, with no stated claims beyond the borders of the republics. But
this recognition also forced Bosnia to choose between becoming
independent or becoming part of Greater Serbia. It is said that Bosnia's
referendum was the disastrous event that precipitated war, but in fact
Bosnia had no choice. The option its leaders would have preferred-
continuation of Yugoslavia-was impossible, because without Croatia and
Slovenia there was no Yugoslavia. This, and not recognition per se, thus set
the stage for war in Bosnia.
When the siege of Sarajevo began in April 1992, the Security Council
responded by sending peacekeepers to insure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and by imposing sanctions on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia for its support of the Bosnian Serb aggression. The United
Nations and European Union then offered various peace plans. Each plan
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became progressively more generous to the Bosnian Serbs, and each plan
foundered in the face of Bosnian Serb unwillingness to make concessions.
These plans failed because they suffered from a profound
misunderstanding of the causes of the war and of the nature of the enemy.
Their premise was that the war in the former Yugoslavia was a civil war-
that with the end of communism, ancient hatreds long suppressed had
bubbled to the surface. The only reasonable course of action, therefore,
was to let the parties fight to exhaustion, while trying to mitigate the
humanitarian consequences and attempting to mediate in some neutral
fashion. All sides were considered more or less equally culpable.
But all sides were not equally culpable. On one side was the JNA,
which had destroyed Vukovar and shelled Dubrovnik, and the Bosnian
Serbs, who kept Sarajevo under seige longer than Leningrad, who
ethnically cleansed seventy percent of Bosnia, who executed 5,000 men in
Brcko and perhaps another 7,000 in Srebrenica, and who kept
concentration camps reminiscent of those run by Hitler. On the other side
were civilians and their often hapless political and military leaders. One
does not have to consider either the Croats or Bosnians saints-and indeed
they were not-in order to pin responsibility for the war where it belongs.
The Clinton Administration, recognizing where the responsibility lay,
believed that action ought to be taken to stop the aggression.
Unfortunately, the most effective action-lifting the arms embargo and
striking Serb targets-was impossible. The Security Council would not
vote to repeal the embargo and our allies, who had troops on the ground as
U.N. peacekeepers, objected that air strikes would expose these troops to
retaliation. The Clinton Administration therefore worked to mitigate the
effects of the embargo. At our behest, the Security Council recognized the
international borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus further
discouraging Belgrade's hopes of acquiring these territories; it tightened
sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and extended them to the
Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and it established an
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia to hold accountable those
responsible for atrocities and to deter future human rights catastrophies.
At the same time, the Administration moved to end a Muslim-Croat
war in Bosnia that pitted the two victims of Serbian aggression against one
other and that threatened to bring sanctions down on Croatia. Through
the summer and fall of 1993, we daily warned the Croatian leadership of
the consequences for Croatia of its support for the Bosnian Croat
separatists who were also committing terrible atrocities-holding prisoners
in inhumane conditions, blocking humanitarian aid convoys, ethnically
cleansing the territory they controlled, and shelling civilian areas such as
East Mostar. Gradually, we produced results. As early as the summer of
1993, prisoners began to be released and humanitarian aid convoys began
to get through. This set the stage for our first major diplomatic initiative, a
proposal for a power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia between the
"Bosniaks" (the Muslims) and the Bosnian Croats that ultimately led to the
Washington Agreement.
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The Washington Agreement, which established the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ended the Muslim-Croat fighting and helped
create a military alliance. As a result, both Bosnia and Croatia were able to
circumvent the arms embargo and over a relatively short period of time-
from March 1994 to August 1995-change the military situation. This did
not surprise us. The Bosnian and Krajina Serbs had many weapons but
few people. Their preferred method of fighting was to fire mortars and
artillery shells into defenseless cities and towns. Theirs was never a highly
motivated force and, like all military forces that engage in such behavior, it
lacked discipline. Once they faced an armed foe, albeit still less well armed
than themselves, the Bosnian and Krajina Serb militaries collapsed.
After establishing the Federation, we sought peaceful solutions to the
Serb rebellions both in Croatia and in Bosnia. Together with the Russian
Federation, the European Union, and the United Nations, we embarked on
the effort to reach a settlement in Croatia that became known as the Z-4
Process-Z-4 to reflect the four Zagreb-based mediators. The process
produced a cease-fire agreement and an agreement on limited economic
cooperation between the rebel Serbs and the Croatian government. It also
included a plan for a settlement that proposed greater autonomy for the
Serbs in the areas where they were a majority and a transitional
arrangement for reversion to full Croatian control in the areas where they
were not.
Together with the Europeans, with whom we formed "the Contact
Group," we simultaneously embarked on a similar effort for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Contact Group's plan provided for a single Bosnia with a
territorial division of fifty-one percent for the Federation, forty-nine
percent for the Serbs. It contained incentives for the parties if they
accepted the plan and disincentives if they did not. The most important
incentive for the Serbs was the lifting of sanctions. After Serbia's President,
Slobodan Milosevic, accepted the plan and agreed to cut off the Bosnian
Serbs, he received as his reward a slight lifting of sanctions. Over time, his
embargo on the Bosnian Serbs, combined with the growing alliance of the
Croatians and the Bosniaks, became the factors that changed the balance of
power in the region.
Still, neither the Contact Group approach nor the Z-4 approach
succeeded. While Croatia accepted the Z-4 Plan as a basis for negotiation,
the Krajina Serbs literally refused to touch a copy of the plan put before
them. They did not understand the forces arrayed against them. The RSK
had a population of 180,000 people living in an area that lacked an
economy. It had long lines to defend, and faced a country of 4.5 million
that enjoyed the support of the international community. Even though the
Z-4 Plan would have given Krajina Serbs virtually complete self-government
over their own territory, their leaders continued to insist that the RSK was a
sovereign state and that the only acceptable solution was international
recognition of their independence.
In a similarly shortsighted and stubborn fashion, Bosnian Serb leaders
refused to accept the Contact Group plan. They held seventy percent of
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Bosnia, and in spite of the pressures they were under, they found it
impossible to figure out which twenty percent to give up. So it continued
this way until ' the summer of 1995, when the Bosnian Serb Amy (BSA)
overran the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. They tried to take another
enclave, Bihac, as well. The Republika Srpska Krajina joined this latter
effort, thereby providing the Croatians with a pretext for military action.
This was not military action that we sought. But after Srebrenica the
calculus became very simple. There were 180,000 people in the Krajina;
there were 160,000 people in Bihac. If the Serbs took Bihac, we believed
they would commit the same kind of massacres they had in Srebrenica,
where they had murdered 7,000 boys and men out of a total population of
30,000. In Bihac, the toll might have reached 60,000 or 70,000. A
Croatian attack might save Bihac but would precipitate the departure of the
Krajina Serb population. There were no good choices.
On August 4, the Croatian Army attacked the Krajina, launching an
offensive that would recapture all Serb-held Croatian territory except
Eastern Slavonia and sweep the BSA out of west Bosnia. These military
operations had terrible humanitarian consequences for the Krajina Serbs;
the population did leave. But these operations also paved the way to the
Dayton and Erdut agreements.
The road to Dayton necessarily ran through Eastern Slavonia, for as
long as a part of Croatia remained in Serb hands, it would also present an
insurmountable barrier to peace in the region. On August 16, Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman asked me to resume my mediation efforts, this
time to find a settlement for Eastern Slavonia. On September 12, the local
Serb leadership agreed to begin negotiations on the basis I had proposed-
a settlement within Croatia. At the end of September, U.N. mediator
Thorvald Stoltenberg joined me in this mediation effort.
Between September 16 and November 12, we prepared four major
proposals for consideration by both sides. The final proposal, the "Basic
Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium," closely
resembled the set of basic principles to which the two sides had agreed on
October 3. Both parties accepted this final draft on November 12, 1995,
and it came to be known as the Erdut Agreement, after the small Eastern
Slavonian town in which it was signed. This agreement included: a one to
two-year transition period to Croatian rule; demilitarization of the area;
extensive human rights provisions, including, above all, the right of
refugees and displaced persons to return home; an insistence on non-
discrimination so that Croats and Serbs would be treated on the same
basis; and local elections.
These local elections, which were held on April 13, 1997, were very
important in changing the mentality of the local Serb leadership. Until the
elections, they had focused on trying to re-negotiate the Erdut Agreement
in order to maintain their autonomy. But when they decided to participate
in the elections as candidates for local office, they began to focus on how to
win in the region's various municipalities. In order to do so, they had to
persuade the local Serb population officially to become citizens of Croatia
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so that they could vote. In the end, roughly three-fourths of the area's
population-about 80,000 Serbs-participated in these elections. It was a
clear sign that they intended to remain in Croatia and that the agreement
would do what it was intended to do-reintegrate the territory in a way that
permits the Serbian population to stay and permits those Croatians and
others driven out very brutally in 1990 who wanted to return home to do
so.
But one hurdle remains-the right of people to return home. Under
the Erdut Agreement, everyone has the right to return home and recover his
property. About 40,000 Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, who fled there from the
formerly Serb-held parts of Croatia after military action, are now living in
the homes of Croats driven out in 1991. In turn, their houses are, now
occupied by Croats ethnically cleansed from Bosnia. The Croatian
Government has taken the position that the Croats who were driven out of
Eastern Slavonia are displaced persons who were forced to flee, but that the
Serbs who left the Krajina are internal migrants who left of their own free
will. Thus, these Serbs are finding it more difficult than the Croats to
reclaim their homes. The only way to solve this problem is to permit
everyone to return to his own home. The principle of non-discrimination
means that the same rules must apply to Serbs as they do to Croats.
As to the Dayton Agreement, which was concluded less than two
weeks after the Erdut Agreement, some things have gone quite well: the
military forces have been separated and put into cantonments; territory has
changed hands; Sarajevo is united; common institutions have been
established; elections have been held; and the country has a presidency
and a parliament. But on some fundamental human rights issues-
freedom of movement, the right of return-virtually nothing has happened,
especially in the Serbian entity, the Republika Srpska.
This non-implementation has serious consequences for the Republika
Srpska. Compliance with the agreement has brought financial assistance
from the international community. Because the Republika Srpska is not
implementing Dayton, ninety-eight percent of the assistance so far has
gone to Bosnia-Herzegovina's other entity, the Federation. No one is
investing in the Republika Srpska. It is producing nothing that anyone
wants to buy. Its unemployment rate is seventy percent. As a result, it is
beginning to look like the Republika Srpska Krajina in 1995-a hollowed
out place where only the mentally and physically infirm, the very old, very
young, and the very poor remain. This is not a place with much prospect of
long-term survival, and unless it changes its ways, the Republika Srpska
will remain under strenuous pressure from those Muslim and Croat
refugees who want to return home. This is the biggest problem that now
exists in Bosnia.
Experience is a great teacher, and there are lessons to be derived from
our experience in the Former Yugoslavia. First, force has a role in
negotiating peace. If you are not prepared to take action against aggression
through collective security measures, then you will probably not succeed in
stopping the aggression. In fact, you may enter into a vicious circle-
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making more and more concessions, appearing weaker and weaker, and
thus encouraging the very aggression you are trying to stop. That is what
happened with the early phases of the Bosnian conflict.
Second, human rights are not a luxury. They are the key to the
success of these and many other peace agreements. The Erdut Agreement
is working principally because of its human rights provisions. The
Croatian government is meeting many of its obligations under the
agreement. The international community is engaged to be sure all
obligations are met, including those on non-discrimination. The
Republika Srpska, on the other hand, is in danger of collapse because it is
not honoring the human rights provisions of the Dayton Agreement,
particularly those on the recovery of property, return of refugees, and
freedom of movement.
Third, there are situations that the world community cannot ignore.
Bosnia is a small country with a population of four million. In itself, it is
not crucial to our national security. But it became so-it became important
to find a solution and not to let it drag on-as it could have become a
source of instability in the heart of Europe.
But there is something else about Bosnia, too. The Bosnian Serbs and
their supporters were seeking to establish an ethnically pure state under
non-democratic, authoritarian leadership. In pursuit of this goal, they
employed very brutal methods. This was not something sui generis. It was
something we thought we had eradicated it fifty years ago. It was, in fact,
the classic definition of fascism-an ethnically-based state with strong,
authoritarian leadership.
The Second World War taught us the consequences of appeasing
aggression. There will be many more crises like Bosnia. We had better
learn to deal with them.

